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The transition from the Cold War to the new strategic landscape has prompted any 
number of studies, assessments, historical analyses, and recommendations regarding US 
national security policy. To say that the landscape remains unclear and that US policy is 
still groping for the proper directions may well be an understatement. The search for 
relevancy in both strategic planning and military restructuring remains a pressing and 
unresolved issue in American policy-making circles, both civilian and military. This book 
is a valuable guide in coming to grips with these issues.  
With an eye to what may be over the horizon, the author offers a sweeping overview of 
the changing nature of collective security and US defence policy. The Cold War security 
environment is examined, how this has changed with the demise of the Soviet Union, 
how all this may play in the remainder of this century and into the next, and what 
principles should guide US policy.  
Three parts shape the book's conceptual framework: US Defence Policy in the Cold War; 
Russian Arms and Aims in the New World Order; and Collective Security, Obstacles and 
Options. Security issues evolving from the Cold War and the new US-Russian security 
relationships connect all three sections.  
There is an excellent summary of US national strategy and defence policy during the 
Cold War period. This lays the groundwork for the remainder of the book. One important 
aspect in this part is the study of civil-military relations, with particular focus on those 
evolving during the Gulf War. Subtitled, "The voyage of Discovery," the author looks at 
evolving American civil-military re lations under the Bush administration and its 
spillover into the next administra tion. The author partly concludes that "Powell's and 
OSD's responses to these new environments demonstrate a search for conceptual 
framework for military planning, not usurpation by the military or lapse of civilian 
control." (p. 56)  
Following this summary, attention is placed on the political-military dy namics within 
Russia and their impact on former Republics and the United States. In "Doing Away with 
Nukes," and how this may affect Russia, the author writes, "As the text already suggests, 
minimum deterrence is on balance the right way to go, but it raises important policy-
planning issues that until now have been smothered under the weight of force ponderosity 
and doctrinal complacency." (p. 111) And the author stresses the importance of re-
examining nuclear deterrence as it evolved in the Cold War and what this means in the 
new environment.  
The final part of the book examines the changing military system within Russia and how 
this impacts on the United States. From this reference point, the efforts by the US to 
adopt a new force structure and strategy are examined. Here the author argues the need to 
break loose from the superpower mentality and Cold War ghosts to examine more 
fruitfully and comprehensively the new conflict patterns and design a relevant strategy. In 
this examination, prevailing issues of force structure and strategy are analyzed, including 
the Bottom Up Review and the notion of two Major Regional Contingencies.  
To emphasize the need for new thinking, a point is made about the erosion of the notion 
of nation-state. This is shown by the shift of conflict patterns from interstate to intrastate 
(sub-state) dimensions. Thus, unconventional conflicts and peacekeeping operations are 
becoming the rule rather than the exception.  
What should draw the attention of those in policy-making circles, is the final chapter, 
"Conclusions." Eight policy-making reference points are offered. These range from the 
inability of states to maintain internal order and political legitimacy, domestic US politics 
and their importance in commitment of military force to the use of "soft power."  
Finally, the author cautions against a return to isolationism as well as the danger of over 
commitment. He offers options on how to find a useful middle ground between these two 
extremes from a permanent assignment of military contingents to the United Nations to 
the "deputizing" of states to act as regional fire fighters.  
There is one problem that any number of readers may face. This is the book's assumption 
that readers fully understand various concepts and the impli cations of US and Russian 
military strategy and doctrines. These include, for example, nuclear realism, structural 
realism, long cycle theory, nuclear positivists, nuclear agnostics, nuclear neo-realists, 
proliferation positivism. In addition, the scope of the study and the various conceptual 
and analytical dimensions may be too much for a reader to digest in one volume.  
While these may be seen as weaknesses by some, it reflects the author's intellectual 
insights and conceptual skills. In brief, the book is a sophisticated analysis and offers rich 
intellectual insights. Further, the book identifies key issues for the US in the remainder of 
this century and into the next. Policy -making reference points and arguments for new 
thinking in dealing with the emerging strategic landscape are particularly challenging. In 
this respect the title of the book is quite appropriate. Not only does the author show that 
the new environment is primarily characterized by collective insecurity, but he also iden 
tifies what the US needs to do to respond to this state of affairs.  
This is an important book, particularly for those trying to decipher the meaning of the 
new international landscape. Equally important, the author does not stop with analyses of 
this new landscape, but offers important insights in how to come to grips with it from the 
US perspective. In doing so, the author has raised intellectual and analytical horizons to a 
higher level, going beyond budg etary defence issues and short-term tactical responses.  
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